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"Evaluative" Mediation Is An Oxymoron 
By Kimberlee K. Kovach 
and Lela P. Love 
The general counsel of a large ship-
ping company once traveled from New 
York to Florida to attend a mandatory 
mediation conference. He went there 
wanting to settle the case, which in-
volved a multi-million dollar dispute 
with a union. In a joint session, the 
court-appointed mediator, who was a 
federal magistrate, urged the company 
to be flexible, warning that the busi-
ness did not have a chance of winning 
on appeal. 
That "evaluation" shut down the 
negotiations. Union representatives 
froze in their position. The general 
counsel left in disgust, since his analy-
sis of the case was so at odds with the 
mediator's opinion. Several years and 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
legal fees later, the company won a 
complete victory in court, which was 
affirmed on appeal. Both sides could 
have saved time and money by negoti-
ating the outcome. 
Incidents like this one illustrate one 
of many pitfalls of what has become 
known as "evaluative" mediation. As 
one commentator recently described it, 
an evaluative mediator assesses the 
strengths and weaknesses of legal 
claims, develops and proposes a settle-
ment, pushes the parties to accept a 
settlement, and predicts court out-
comes and/ or the impact of not set-
tling, See "Mediator Orientations, 
Strategies and Techniques," by Leonard 
L. Riskin, Alternatives, September 1994 
at p. 111. Widespread as these activities 
have become, they are inconsistent with 
the role of a mediator. 
An essential characteristic of media-
tion is facilitated negotiation. Unlike a 
judge or arbitrator who ultimately sides 
with one party in pronouncing the "win-
ners" and "losers," a mediator must re-
main neutral throughout the process. 
Only by remaining neutral can a me-
diator use the tools of facilitated nego-
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tiation: encourage parties to examine 
and articulate underlying interests; rec-
ognize common interests and comple-
mentary goals; and engage in creative 
problem-solving to find resolutions ac-
ceptable and optimal for all parties. 
Mediators should encourage parties 
to evaluate suggested options and al-
ternatives and the viability of poten-
tial agreements. Mediators also should 
encourage parties to get outside advice, 
opinions and evaluations from appro-
priate experts. But mediators should 
not do these things themselves. 
"Evaluative" mediation is an oxymo-
ron. It jeopardizes neutrality because 
a mediator's assessment invariably fa-
vors one side over the other. Addition-
ally, evaluative activities discourage 
understanding between and problem-
solving by the parties. Instead, media-
tor evaluation tends to perpetuate or 
create an adversarial climate. Parties 
try to persuade the neutral of their 
positions, using confrontational and 
argumentative approaches. In some 
cases, the party whose position the 
mediator disfavored will simply leave 
the process. 
Norms and Standards 
Furthermore, if we permit mediators 
to give evaluations and assessments, we 
should give them norms and standards 
to guide those evaluations. Society 
entrusts judges, arbi-
trators and other 
decision makers to ren-
der decisions, awards 
and opinions based 
on their training and 
expertise. Such deci-
sion makers operate 
within a framework 
of ethical norms and legal standards 
which direct their evaluations. This is 
not the case with mediators. 
The Model Standards of Conduct for 
Mediators, recently promulgated by the 
American Bar Association, the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association and the 
Society of Professionals in Dispute 
Resolution, are at odds with "evalua-
tive mediation." These standards say 
that the principle of self-determination 
is central to the mediation process and 
prohibit a mediator from providing 
professional advice. These standards 
also provide that mediators who en-
gage in other processes must inform 
the parties. Fairness requires accurate 
labels of the neutral intervenor's role, 
labels that do not mislead the parties. 
Despite these considerations, many 
practicing mediators have an evalua-
tive orientation. Yet most mediation 
trainers, teachers and professors don't 
teach evaluation as a permissible com-
ponent of mediation. The courts and 
the legal community are largely re-
sponsible for this paradox. 
Role of Courts 
As the gatekeepers of legal disputes, 
courts have established mediation pro-
grams chiefly to get cases settled and 
clear dockets. Settlement rates are of-
ten the primary measure of success in 
such programs. Frequently, mediation 
becomes a variation of the familiar ju-
dicial settlement conferences. During 
such meetings,judges often engage in 
"arm twisting," focusing on the weak-
nesses of each party's case and predict-
ing unfavorable litigation outcomes. 
Such approaches settle cases, but they 
are not consonant with mediation's 
primary goals of enhancing under-
standing between parties and encour-
. aging parties to create outcomes that 
respond to underlying interests. The 
personalized and unique outcome of 
mediation is often very different from 
a "likely court outcome." 
Many court-annexed mediation pro-
grams require that the mediator be a 
lawyer, skewing the mediator pool to-
wards those with training in evaluative 
processes. Limited budgets for media-
tor education result in inadequate 
( continued on the following page) 
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training, so lawyers acting as court-ap-
pointed mediators never shed their 
evaluative habits. 
Lawyers as advocates also influence 
the mediation process. Rarely experi-
enced with mediation ( or educated 
about it), they are more comfortable 
with neutrals who have substantive ex-
pertise and evaluative skills. Under-
standably, they direct their clients 
towards neutrals who fit into familiar 
patterns of dispute resolution. 
During mediation, counsel often 
stick to the traditional role of speak-
ing for the client. In court-annexed 
programs, for example, lawyers typi-
cally present the case, and do all the 
negotiating. Most of the discussion fo-
cuses on damages for legal causes of 
action. Again, these practices are in-
consistent with primary objectives of 
mediation: promoting self-determina-
tion of parties and helping the parties 
examine their real interests and de-
velop mutually acceptable solutions. 
What's At Stake? 
If "mediation" becomes an umbrella 
term that includes neutrals in evalua-
tive roles, it will threaten a number of 
important values: 
Uniformity. To develop rules, stan-
dards, ethical norms and certification 
requirements, legislators and admin-
istrators need well-defined and uni-
form processes. Similarly, meaningful 
CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution 
program evaluations require unifor-
mity. Evaluation and facilitation require 
different skills and expertise and gen-
erate different outcomes. Evaluative 
and facilitative activities should have ac-
curate - and separate-labels and 
should not be mixed in one program. 
Whether they choose to mediate pri-
vately or must participate in court-an-
nexed programs, disputants and 
attorneys need to know what to expect. 
"Mediation" should mean the same 
thing from state to state, and from one 
court to another within a state. Of 
course, programs will vary, but the pub-
lic should understand the essential 
nature of each dispute resolution pro-
cess. Unhappy surprises destroy pub-
lic confidence. 
If mediators evaluate cases and pro-
vide opinions, mediation starts to look 
like case evaluation, neutral expert 
opinion and non-binding arbitration. 
Only with meaningful labels and 
bright-line distinctions between pro-
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cesses, can disputants and attorneys 
evaluate particular approaches, and 
"match" them to appropriate disputes. 
Clear Goals. Financial gurus often say, 
"the Street (meaning Wall Street) 
likes a pure play." What they mean is 
that enterprises with a single-minded 
and clear-cut focus are most likely to 
succeed. Likewise, "mediation" 
should be a "pure play." It should con-
note facilitation. That limits the neutral 
to helping the parties communicate 
effectively with each other, identify 
and address all the negotiating issues, 
and develop proposals acceptable to 
all parties. 
Mediation's Unique Role. Mediation 
assumes that people have the resources 
and creative capacity to resolve their 
own disputes better-and differ-
ently-than an arbitrator or ajudge 
would. Contrast this view of mediation 
with our legal system. It relies on an 
outside authority like a judge to decide 
cases for the parties, applying legal 
norms and rules to the "facts" as the 
parties have presented them. "Evalua--
tive mediation" shifts mediation back 
into the comfortable framework of the 
adversarial norm. 
Lawyers will not stretch to under-
stand and use new paradigms unless 
they have to. Mediation should stand 
as a distinct and clear-cut alternative 
to the evaluative and frequently 
highly-adversarial processes that law-
yers know best. lil!t 
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